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Since the start of economic reforms in the late 1970s, internal migration, along with 
urbanisation, has brought about the most profound social changes in China. With 
China’s rural migrant workers numbering in the hundreds of millions and dominating 
the labour market in the country’s fastest growing regions, this group embodies 
China’s most intractable problems of socio-economic stratification. For this reason, 
the experiences of this social group have become an important area of inquiry. 
Centring on the figure of rural migrants in Chinese cities, this chapter aims to do three 
things. First, it provides an account of how the hukou system—the residential 
registration system—has shaped the pattern of China’s rural-to-urban migration and 
the formation of the socio-political identities of migrant individuals. This is followed 
by a discussion of the diversity and internal differences within the rural migrant 
cohort, paying attention to how gender, place and type of employment intersect to 
shape varying levels of subaltern subjectivity and political consciousness. Finally, the 
chapter reviews the main perspectives from both critical scholarship and public 
discourses on the subjects of rural-to-urban migration and the experiences of rural 
migrant individuals. 
 
Hukou System, Migration Pattern and Rural Migrant Identities 
 
Since its implementation in the late 1950s, China’s long-standing and deeply 
ingrained hukou system has effectively differentiated the nation along urban-rural 
lines, with up to seventy percent of the population having rural hukou. While the 
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system effectively restricted individual mobility during several decades of socialism, 
it has also created a legal and practical distinction between peasants (who have rural 
hukou) and non-peasants (who have urban hukou). The rigidity of the system means 
that people born into families with rural hukou have had great difficulties converting 
to urban hukou status. It is also intrinsically discriminatory, since those with rural 
hukou are not entitled to urban privileges, including employment (especially 
employment in the public service sector), public education, public health cover, 
subsidised housing and a wide range of other state-provided benefits. This system of 
differentiation accounts for the two-tiered nature of citizenship in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Since the onset of economic reforms, both the state and the 
market have come to recognise that rural migrant labour is essential to the market 
economy and the development of urban China, and so both parties have encouraged 
and facilitated the entry of rural migrants into the city. 
 
This is not to suggest that the rural-to-urban movement in the era of economic reforms 
was without its historical antecedents. Plenty of research points to the periodic 
movement of the rural population to the city prior to the implementation of economic 
reforms (Chi and Zhu 2004; Solinger 1999; Zhang 2001). Nor is it to suggest that the 
rural-to-urban movement since the start of the economic reforms was always a smooth 
and easy process. In comparison with younger cohorts of rural migrants who came to 
the city since the late 1990s, the first generation of rural migrants who came to the 
city in the 1980s experienced not only the physical and spiritual anguish of loneliness 
and the contempt of urban residents, but they were also subject to much greater 
punishment. For instance, up to the 1990s, rural migrants were required to register 
with the local authorities and produce temporary residency permits, and were often 
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subjected to random searches. Failure to present ID cards, temporary residency 
permits and other required documentation would result in rural migrants being sent 
back home, detained, charged monetary fines and harassed, often brutally, by the 
police. It became apparent in the 1990s that urban residents’ improved livelihoods and 
China’s staggering increase in GDP were achieved on the backs of millions of rural 
migrant workers. Yet, for a long time, rural migrants were referred to derogatorily, 
both in popular language and policy statements, as members of a ‘floating population’ 
(mangliu), who were seen to be drifting aimlessly and causing fear, anxiety and 
disorder in the city (Dutton 1998). Li Zhang (2001) argues that the public and official 
discourses of the floating population in the late 1980s and 1990s dehumanised and 
abnormalised the migrant population, and functioned as an essential part of the social 
control and governmental surveillance of rural migrants. In these discourses, the 
migrant population was portrayed as an ‘amorphous flow of undifferentiated labourers 
without histories’, and migrants were seen as ‘flocks of raw labour that can be used 
and expelled at any time (Zhang 2001: 31). 
 
Despite this rough beginning, rural migrants have continued to arrive in the city en 
masse in search of employment and economic opportunities  (Chan and Buckingham 
2008; Solinger 1999; Wang 2005; Zhang 2002). The 2013 Chinese Census reveals 
that the number of rural migrants has reached 262 million, constituting more than a 
quarter of the world’s mobile population (Zhonghua renmin 2013). Among the 
internal migrant cohort, the majority is of rural origin, and by 2010 as many as forty-
seven percent of them were born after 1980, fast becoming the mainstay of China’s 




While the relaxation of some aspects of the hukou system has led to mobility across 
the country on a massive scale, and while the regulatory and social control mechanism 
has become less punitive, discrimination remains. The reforms of the hukou system 
have not in the least done away with the discriminatory mechanism of the system. The 
two-tiered form of citizenship continues to play a pivotal role in shaping the 
systematic practice of social exclusion against the rural population. Such exclusion 
manifests itself most tangibly in the unequal distribution of a range of social benefits, 
including health care, education, housing and employment (Chan and Selden 2013; 
Chan and Buckingham 2008; Dutton 1998; Jacka 2006; Pun 2005; Solinger 1999; 
Wang 2005; Zhang 2001, 2002). While a small percentage of migrant workers have 
achieved significant gains in socio-economic status—enabling them to obtain urban 
hukou—the majority still subsist as dagong individuals (originally a Cantonese 
expression meaning ‘working for the boss’), retaining rural hukou and finding it 
difficult, if not impossible, to develop a sense of belonging in the city. This acute 
sense of a lack—of prospects and direction—is particularly pronounced among young 
migrant workers. In comparison with older generations, who may have made some 
money and returned home, second-generation rural migrant workers born after the 
1980s and 1990s, and increasingly those born in the new millennium, are more 
determined to stay in the city, despite the precarious nature of their employment 
options and living circumstances, and despite their uncertain future in terms of 
marriage prospects and a sense of belonging in the city.  
 
With the exception of domestic workers, more than fifty percent of whom live in their 
urban employers’ home (Sun 2009), most dagong migrants live in one of three 
common arrangements: a rental property (usually shared with other migrant workers) 
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on the periphery of the city; on the premises of the shops, businesses and construction 
sites that employ them; and in dormitories provided by their employers (Solinger 
1999). In terms of gender, 66.4 percent are men, meaning that women now account 
for a third of all rural migrant workers (Zhonghua renmin 2013). While factories in 
southern China mostly employ young, single women and men (Pun 2005), migrants in 
other areas are much more varied. Some are married but with their spouse and child 
back home; others have their spouse in the city, but not necessarily living with them. 
The phenomenon of migrant workers’ children being left in the care of relatives in the 
home village is widespread. 
 
The percentage of young migrants is increasing. By 2010, as many as 42.8 percent of 
migrants were born after 1980, making this age group the ‘mainstay’ of China’s 
labour force (Huang 2011). The marital status of rural migrants is also changing. 
While a 2006 survey indicated that up to eighty percent of the migrant labour force 
was married, a 2009 survey suggests that this figure has dropped to twenty percent, 
implying that eighty percent of the current migrant labour force is now single. In both 
spatial and temporal terms, this state of liminality—being neither here nor there, and 
finding it hard to negotiate the past and future—creates among migrant workers a 
widely and deeply felt existential angst (Chan and Pun 2010; Sun 2010). 
 
Rural migrant workers are commonly referred to as ‘nongmingong’. Literally 
meaning ‘peasant worker’, this is a loosely applied term describing a person of rural 
hukou who has come to the city to dagong. However, while the expression is very 
widely used to refer to rural migrant workers, there is a paradox in its use. On the one 
hand, it captures the ambiguous socio-economic identity of this large social group: 
 
 6 
without an urban hukou, they are by definition rural residents, yet they are employed 
in the city as workers. On the other hand, using this generic label runs the risk of 
mistaking the experiences and activities of one sub-group of migrant workers for 
those of the whole. Moreover, the cultural politics of such naming, and its impact on 
the self-perceptions of rural migrant workers, is not clearly understood. Some 
advocates from rural migrant empowerment organizations with whom I discussed the 
issue argued that the term ‘nongmingong’ is insulting to rural migrant workers as it 
insists on labeling people as ‘peasants’ even though they may no longer work—or 
may never have worked—as peasants. These advocates also argue that the term 
provides moral cover for denying rural migrant workers the rights and entitlements 
that are available to urban workers who occupy similar roles. Further, from my 
conversations with many young factory workers, as well as with women in the service 
and hospitality sector, it is clear that while they generally described themselves as 
dagong individuals, most of these individuals did not identify themselves as 
nongmingong; they thought that this was a term reserved for rural migrants who 
worked on construction sites. The label is also potentially essentialist, in that it can 
encourage the assumption that some forms of rural migrant experience are more 
authentic and representative than others. However, despite the contested and 
extremely fraught nature of the label, it continues to be widely used in policy 
statements, media reports and academic papers, as well as within some migrant 
worker NGOs.  
 
Similarly, much has been said about the complex and fraught nature of the dagongmei 
as a social identity. ‘Dagong’ is a Cantonese expression which means ‘working for 
the boss’ and dagongmei refers to the migrant women workers. On the whole, 
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although originally known for her ‘docility’, ‘nimble fingers’, and ‘pure and 
productive body’ (Pun 2005)—all suitable for production on the assembly line—the 
term dagongmei has evolved to become a general term describing all rural migrant 
women offering their cheap labour in a wide range of occupations in exchange for 
monetary and other material gains. In south China, dagongmei are often referred to as 
bei mei (northern girls), but who is a northern girl depends on the person using the 
term and, more importantly, where the term is used. In Hong Kong, a bei mei is a 
migrant woman worker from mainland China, often engaged in the sex industry. To 
local residents in Guangdong Province, bei mei refers to any Chinese woman who is 
north of Guangdong. Similar geocentric and sexist logic works in terms such as 
wailaimei (women from outside) used in Shanghai, and dalumei (women from the 
mainland) used in Taiwan. But the configuration of bei mei, which is almost always 
derogatory in use, is not just geographical. It is also moral-sexual. In Hong Kong, it is 
often used to describe prostitutes working either in Hong Kong (like the woman in the 
film Durian Durian) or southern cities such as Shenzhen (Cartier 2001: 193). In Bei 
Mei, a novel by Sheng Keyi, the term bei mei describes women who practice a new 
moral economy of sex regardless of their occupation. The northern girls in the novel 
include cleaners, hotel room attendants, waitresses, domestic servants, company 
receptionists, as well as sex workers. In other words, although bei mei are indelibly 
associated with sexual transgression, they are not necessarily synonymous with sex 
workers, despite the fact that ‘northern girls’ can work as sex workers. In her ground-
breaking ethnography of factory workers in south China, Pun Ngai argues that 
dagongmei (migrant women workers) is a ‘specific Chinese subaltern’ (Pun 2005: 15) 
and, as such, ‘is a specific cultural-symbolic artefact as well as a worker-subject, 
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constituted at the particular moment when transnational capital came to China in the 
postsocialist period’ (Pun 2005: 18).  
 
Rural migrant workers are different from earlier state sector workers, who were part 
of the low-wage system that minimised wage differentials and maximised universal 
welfare benefits. They are also different from new state sector workers, who are urban 
residents and enjoy the benefits of state subsidies for housing, health insurance and 
pensions. While workers in both the old and new state sectors are considered the 
backbone of China’s working classes, the question of the class status of the 
nongmingong is still open to debate. If we are to apply a Marxist definition of class, 
nongmingong, who are peasants working in the city, do not constitute a class. For this 
reason many analysts, invoking a Weberian notion of economic, political and social 
status, prefer to consider rural migrants as constituting the bottom stratum of 
contemporary urban China (e.g. Li 2004). Others prefer to view them as part of the 
‘new working class’ (Carrillo and Goodman 2012) or ‘rural migrant working class’, 
and position them somewhere on an ‘arc of incomplete proletarianization’ (Chan and 
Selden 2013). Some recent research (e.g. Zavoretti 2017) also suggests that if we 
consider rural migrants from the perspective of income, consumption and lifestyle, 
class formation, rather than hukou, has become more relevant to understanding 
inequality in China.  
 
Internal Differences Within the nongmingong Cohort 
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Within the nongmingong cohort, there are vast differences, including the wide range 
of occupations they pursue. As early as the late 1980s it was possible to identify the 
six most common types of employment undertaken by China’s rural migrants: 
manufacturing, service and hospitality, construction, cottage-style garment-
processing, garbage- and scrap-collecting and domestic work (Solinger 1999). A 
recent survey of rural migrant workers reveals some shifts in this profile, listing the 
following six major areas of employment: manufacturing (35.7 percent); construction 
(18.4 percent); domestic and other services (12.2 percent); retail and small businesses 
(9.8 percent); transport, storage, and postal delivery (6.6 percent); and restaurant and 
hospitality (5.2 percent). In terms of gender, 66.4 percent are men, meaning that 
women now account for a third of all rural migrant workers (Zhonghua renmin 2013). 
A small number of migrants are employed in various forms of the sexualised service 
industry, such as sex workers and bar hostesses (Zheng 2004; Jeffreys 2004).  
 
The internal differences within the rural migrant worker group can be appreciated in 
sociological terms, including the worker’s relationship to the employer, labour 
conditions, level of organised representation, skill level, gender, age, marital status 
and parental status. Differences can also be found in everyday practices, including 
workers’ everyday lives in the city, ranging from their capacity to partake in urban 
consumption, their relationship to the city and city life, living arrangements, as well as 
their level of attachment to the land, family and village life. Finally, the differences 
can be listed in cultural terms, manifesting themselves in one’s sense of identity, 
belonging and subjectivity, as well as the affective landscape of individuals—




It is clear that working conditions, wages and the labour politics of state-
owned enterprises are diverse across the manufacturing sector, but evidence suggests 
that urban workers in state owned enterprises (SOEs) fare much better than 
nongmingong workers in terms of livelihood and job security (Unger and Chan 2007; 
Lee 2002, 2007a, 2007b). Having said that, it is also true that urban employees who 
are either “retired” or laid off in the process of industrial restructuring  in the 1990s 
have had to join the ranks of the “urban poor” and become recipients of the Minimum 
Livelihood Guarantee (zuidi shenghuo baozhang) when their family income falls 
below a locally-set poverty line (Solinger 2010). For the first time, many of these 
workers must compete directly with nongmingong for jobs. 
  
 
It is also possible that a particular structure of grievances may arise from the unique 
set of issues confronting an individual migrant worker in any given employment 
group. For example, domestic workers’ feelings and pride are chronically injured due 
to a lack of respect from their employers (Yan 2008; Sun 2009; Hu 2011); 
construction workers often do not get paid on time or at all (Pun and Lu 2010a, 
2010b); and factory workers must cope with the feeling of alienation that comes from 
working twelve hours on the assembly line (Sun 2012a). On the other hand, from the 
point of view of employers and urban residents, a particular type of emotional 
response may dominate their perception of a specific migrant group. Thus, for 
instance, the domestic worker commonly elicits distrust from employers; the 
construction worker arouses public compassion and anxiety; and the sex worker 
provokes disgust and moral hatred. Cultural differences can also be seen in the great 
diversity of experiences with media and information technologies. For example, older 
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construction workers often have little exposure to television, news, reading materials 
or the Internet, while younger factory workers commonly have access to a wide 
variety of entertainment sources, including computer games in Internet cafés and 
mobile technologies such as the mobile phone, as well as regular participation in 
social media.  
 
Between construction workers and factory workers, there is one profound difference 
in terms of contractual terms and conditions. Factory workers are paid monthly 
wages, as agreed in their contract, whereas most construction companies, which do 
not sign contracts with workers, do not pay wages on a regular basis. Instead, they 
make payments at the end of the year, or when the worker leaves the job. Moreover, 
the rate of pay and other conditions are often based on verbal agreements between the 
worker and the company, and are often arranged through intermediaries (Pun and Lu 
2010a, 2010b). As a result, wage arrears and labour disputes are pandemic within the 
construction sector in urban China. In fact, unpaid wages seem to be the norm rather 
than exception.  
 
Sociological scholarship on rural migrant construction workers tells us that there are 
at least three reasons for the phenomenon of wages arrears. First, there is no workers’ 
union in China that operates independently of the Chinese state and functions 
effectively to protect the rights of rural migrant workers. Second, despite the 
government’s requirement for construction companies to sign labour contracts with 
individual workers, only a small percentage of workers enter such a contractual 
relationship, and most rural migrants work on a casual basis. Third, the construction 
industry in reform-era China is characterised by a complex and complicit arrangement 
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between the state and capital, resulting in a multiplicity of (sub)contractual tiers, with 
intense competition and clear demarcation of labour roles within each phase of 
construction (Pun and Lu 2010a, 2010b). The widespread, entrenched and consistent 
problems of wage arrears and wage reduction have bred what Pun and Lu call a 
‘culture of violence’ (Pun and Lu 2010a) among migrant construction workers  and 
deep-seated hostility between the management and workers. Well-publicised in the 
media and vivid in urban residents’ imagination are the perennial incidents of rural 
migrant construction workers threatening self-harm, often in public and spectacularly 
desperate ways, in order to force their bosses to pay the wages owed to them. The first 
reported incident of rural migrant workers threatening suicides on top of tall buildings 
took place towards the end of 2002, precipitating a steady and widespread increase in 
similar incidents across the country in the subsequent year or so, within a general 
frame of portraying with sympathy the social and economic injustices experienced by 
rural migrants (e.g. Chen 2004; Wei 2004). As one Chinese commentator observes of 
these migrant workers’ choiceless choice, ‘when the public and social mechanism of 
seeking justice cannot operate as it should, and where rational and legal channels of 
voice-seeking are blocked, unusual, extraordinary, and individually devised means 
become the only choice available’ (Xu 2007).  
 
Besides construction work, factory work in the Pearl River and Yangtze River Deltas has 
absorbed nearly forty percent of the total mobile population (Li 2004). Furthermore, 
factories are also places where a young generation of rural migrants—in their late teens 
and twenties—concentrates. Born in the 1980s, and 1990s, and the beginning of the new 
millennium, they are better educated in comparison with migrant workers in other 
occupations, such as domestic workers, construction workers and small business retailers. 
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Furthermore, in contrast to the older migrants who see themselves as sojourners in the 
city, most factory workers are single and have a much more tenuous connection with the 
land. In fact, most have very little, if any, farming experience and skills before coming to 
the city, and many of them are not interested in going back. These young workers are at 
marriageable age, and yet many face difficulties in finding a suitable marriage mate or 
maintain a stable intimate relationship (Sun 2017a, Sun 2017b).  
 
In comparison with construction workers, factory workers are subject to a much 
higher level of discipline within the industrial regime. Industrialization entails putting 
in place a range of spatial and institutional practices in order to turn ‘a young and 
rural body into an industrialised and productive laborer’ (Pun 2005: 77), thereby 
transforming ‘lazy and unproductive’ laborers’ ‘bodies and minds, behaviors and 
beliefs, gestures and habits, and attitudes and aptitudes’ (Pun 2005: 79). Factory 
workers are also thought to be the most rights-conscious cohort among rural migrants, 
as evidenced by the sporadic, though not uncommon, strikes and other forms of 
collective action at China’s factories (Leung and So 2012). A combination of the 
rigidity of industrial management rules and a loss of emotional connection with their 
cultural background, as well as an inability to belong to and identify with the city, 
produces among young workers a prevailing sense of alienation, despair and 
existential uncertainty, leading them to question the meaning of life and the worth of 
work.  
 
The most well publicised incidents involve the suicides and suicide attempts of more 
than a dozen young workers at Apple’s Foxconn factory in Shenzhen between January 
and November 2010. Foxconn is a large contract manufacturer producing parts for a 
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variety of companies, including Apple, Dell, HP, Motorola, Nintendo, Nokia 
and Sony. As a response to these suicides, Foxconn announced the decision to 
increase wages for its workers, and as a preventative measure, the management 
installed suicide-prevention netting, and asked employees to sign pledges not to 
commit suicides. Investigating the context and background to the workers’ suicides, 
Chan, Pun and Selden turn their attention to the broader political-economic context of 
the buyer-driven value chain, in which Apple establishes parameters and control over 
price-setting, production processes and product delivery from its suppliers, notably 
Foxconn. Analyzing the consequences of this asymmetrical power relationship, the 
authors show that as the scale of production has ramped up, Apple’s ‘value capture’ 
and profits have soared while Foxconn’s margins have flatlined, leading to massive 
intensification of work and a harsh workplace managerial regime (Chan, Pun and 
Selden 2013). 
 
Although it is the construction workers and factory workers who often capture public 
attention, it is the rural migrants in other lines of employment, such as service, 
hospitality and domestic workers, who prove to be indispensable to urban residents. 
Apart from sex work, domestic work is perhaps the most gendered form of 
employment taken up by rural migrants. However, unlike their dagongmei 
counterparts employed on the factory production lines, who live in the ‘dormitory 
labor regime’ and are mostly young—between twenty-two and twenty-four years 
old—and single (Pun 2007; Pun and Smith 2007), migrant domestic workers can be 
anywhere from fifteen to over seventy years old (most of them are clustered from 
their late twenties to forties), and many of them are married with children. Having no 
urban hukou and therefore living as transients in the city, most migrant domestic 
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workers dwell in one of three kinds of accommodation: full-time domestics have live-
in positions with their employers; part-time and day-time domestics tend to rent 
rooms in farmhouses outside Beijing, traveling long distances to work in urban and 
suburban homes; and casual cleaners/domestic helpers sleep in dormitories provided 
by the residential property management group (wuye guanli) that employs them, 
usually in the basements of the residential apartment buildings they service. Part-time 
domestics, who generally live with their spouses and children in rented rooms, are 
able to sustain a more stable family life than full-time and casual workers. But 
regardless of these differences in living arrangements, most migrant domestic workers 
tend to see themselves as sojourners in the city to varying degrees, and refrain from 
making emotional, psychological or practical investments accordingly. This also 
discourages their urban employers from investing in and cultivating long-term 
relationships with them. 
 
Disputes between employers and their domestic employees are legion. Domestic 
workers regularly complain about their ungenerous wages; the scarcity of time for rest, 
recreation and holidays; and their employers’ distrust, fussiness, lack of respect and 
downright contempt for their maids (Gaetano 2004; Jacka 2006). While reputable 
agencies try to mediate between the two parties, most wash their hands of this 
responsibility once introduction fees from employers and domestic workers have 
changed hands. To date, there are no legally binding contracts specifying employers’ 
and domestic workers’ respective responsibilities, nor is there legislation stipulating 
minimum wages, basic working conditions and rights and benefits for domestic 
workers. Unlike factory workers and many other categories of employees, domestic 
workers are not protected by labour law, have no guaranteed time off or paid leave 
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and enjoy no entitlement to health care, retirement or other benefits. Beijing’s 
Domestic Service Center does recommend to employers that live-in maids be given at 
least two days off each month, are allowed at least eight hours of sleep each day and 
are paid extra for working on public holidays and New Year’s Day. But such 
recommendations are not legally binding, are left to the discretion of employers and 
are frequently ignored. 
 
Rural Migrants in Critical Scholarship and Public Discourses 
 
One of the earliest and perhaps the most encompassing work on rural migrants and 
internal migration is Dorothy Solingers’s book Contesting Citizenship in Urban 
China (1999). This book provides a comprehensive account of the range of 
discriminations experienced by rural migrants in the Chinese city. Restricted by their 
non-urban hukou, most rural migrants are limited to jobs that are dirty, dangerous, 
difficult and low paying—jobs shunned by urbanites. Most importantly, these jobs are 
without the sort of benefits and remuneration packages that are taken for granted by 
urban workers. Job opportunities aside, having a rural hukou also excludes migrants 
from claiming an entire range of other urban entitlements, including education, 
housing subsidies and medical care, effectively turning these sojourners into second-
class citizens. Also engaging with the question of urban citizenship, Li Zhang’s study 
of the spatial politics of ‘Zhejiang Village’ in Beijing uncovers a number of ways in 
which ‘urban citizenship’ administered through the hukou system discriminates 
against rural migrants, by curtailing their entitlement to claim urban space (Zhang 
2001, 2002). Subsequent anthropological work on rural migrants tends to focus on a 
particular line of employment, including factory work in south China (Pun 2005), the 
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construction sector (Pun and Lu 2010a, 2010b), domestic work (Yan 2008; Sun 2009; 
Hu 2011, the service and hospitality sector (Hanser 2008; Otis 2012) and sex work 
(Zheng 2009). These works document migrants’ working conditions and living 
circumstances, as well as the impact of mobility on rural migrants’ lives, and it is 
possible to discern a few common concerns.  
 
Rural migrants have been a prominent empirical figure in the critique of the suzhi 
(quality) discourse. Yan Hairong, who has maintained a long-standing interest in the 
figure of the domestic worker as an object of governmentality, has convincingly 
demonstrated the importance of the suzhi discourse in the process of subject formation. 
Her study of the maid-employer relationship argues eloquently that subject-making, 
be it cosmopolitan or subaltern, is not an ‘enclosed’, isolated process involving a 
singular subject, but is rather a ‘problematic, open-ended, and relational process 
relying on interplay between subjects’ (Yan 2006: 246). Similarly, Ann Anagnost 
juxtaposes the figure of the rural migrant with that of the urban middle-class ‘only 
child’ in order to argue that suzhi codes the difference between these two social 
groups by derogating migrant bodies and sanctioning the ‘transfer of economic value 
from one body to another’ (Anagnost 2004: 191). She argues further that the suzhi 
discourse ‘works ideologically as a regime of representation through which subjects 
recognise their positions within the larger social order’ (193). In addition, Jacka (2006, 
2009) suggests that the potency of the suzhi discourse derives from its capacity to 
generate affect, including both the desire for higher levels of suzhi for oneself and 
sympathy and contempt for others who have less. Also considering the experience of 
the domestic worker, Sun takes the critique of suzhi in another direction and argues 
that public statements about the quality of individuals increasingly take on an external, 
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spatial and geographic dimension. In other words, the possession or lack of suzhi by 
an individual or group seems increasingly attributable to place of origin. She argues 
that an understanding of the ways in which the mobile body is inscribed with 
difference is crucial to uncovering the variegated processes commodifying and 
objectifying the migrant body. Furthermore, she extends the suzhi debate into the 
realm of popular culture and explores how television’s most watched genre—the 
drama series—represents the figure of the maid. She argues that popular media and 
cultural productions have a crucial role in constructing rural migrants as wanting in 
suzhi and in need of development, education and civilization (Sun 2009). 
 
Critiques of how suzhi is deployed in the management of rural migrants also provide 
crucial clues to understanding how rural migrants are discursively constructed in both 
state-authorised discourses and popular cultural expressions. Widespread socio-
economic stratification has not only led to the marginalisation of workers in material 
senses, it has also given rise to the ‘culture of inequality’ (Sun 2013), evidenced in the 
hegemonic language of the urban, consumer-oriented middle class, along with the 
marginalisation of workers’ and peasants’ voices. The state, capital, international 
NGOs and transnational cultural elites all jostle to speak for and on behalf of China’s 
rural migrant workers, and the sexuality of rural migrant women is an integral 
dimension of the constructed dagongmei identity. For instance, the sexuality of 
dagong individuals—men and women—is portrayed in policy and academic 
discourses as a source of social instability and moral disorder. 
 
Migrant workers are typically described as members of the ‘three-low 
communities’—low income, low literacy and low consumption power—and are 
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therefore not the primary target audience for commercial media. Stratification is most 
pronounced in the media and popular culture industry targeting women. While capital, 
including domestic and transnational capital, targets upwardly mobile, young and 
educated urban Chinese women, vast numbers of rural women, including rural 
migrant women, have few media outlets that speak to or give voice to them, apart 
from the magazine Nongjianu Baishitong (Rural Women Knowing All) (Jacka 2004; 
Zhao 2008). Lan Ling (Journal for Migrant Women), the only monthly magazine 
which explicitly gave voice to migrant women, had to close down in late 2007 due to 
lack of funding. 
 
Popular media, consisting of tabloid, consumer and lifestyle media outlets, cater to a 
highly stratified readership (Zhao 2002; Sun 2004), despite their occasional 
sympathetic coverage of migrant workers and their sometimes populist sentiments. 
On the whole, migrant workers are portrayed in popular representations as sources of 
urban anxiety, fascination and fear, and thus tend to come across as needing to be 
controlled (Sun 2004, 2009; Zhao 2002) or as the raw material for civilizing, 
education and self-development efforts (Jacka 1998; Davin 1999; Dutton 1999; Sun 
2004; Yan 2008). Commercial media also tend to focus on the rural migrant as a 
figure of criminality, the ‘marriage wrecker’, or the ‘gold-digger’—a migrant worker 
marrying or offering sex to her geriatric employer in order to get her hands on his 
money and property and gain access to urban privileges (Sun 2009). A rural migrant 
can also be a naïve and unsophisticated outsider in town, though well meaning and 
trustworthy (Sun 2012b).  
State media narratives urge rural migrants to engage in ceaseless self-improvement 
and develop a strong sense of self-respect, self-reliance and resilience, which are 
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essential to, and are crucial manifestations of, achieving good suzhi (Jacka 2006; Sun 
2009; Yan 2008). On the other hand, they also actively explore ways of representing 
rural migrants in ways that make them feel appreciated and included. This is largely 
due to the fact that the management of the social conflicts that result from this 
growing inequality and stratification has become a top priority in the state’s efforts to 
maintain stability (weiwen). Since the mid-2000s, the discursive regime of ‘social 
harmony’ has become the ‘main melody’ in Chinese politics, forming an integral part 
of the co-ordinated and orchestrated machinery of stability-maintenance. In this 
discursive regime, rural migrant workers, regarded as one of the most destabilising 
factors, figure increasingly prominently. Along with this focus in the political realm, 
the figure of the nongmingong (rural migrant worker) has also become a favourite 
subject matter in documentary films that focus on marginal identities. These media 
products are usually didactic in content and tone. Despite the unreserved praise and 
generous accolades given to rural migrants, rural migrant individuals appear in the 
series only to be seen, rather than heard. Their experiences in the city—happy, sad, 
frustrating or humiliating—are narrated through the voice-over, functioning to give 
context and substance to the general argument being made about recognition. 
 
This does not mean that migrant workers are content with silence (Jacka 1998). 
Against all odds and with varying degrees of success, they have formed strategic 
alliances with various social forces, including supportive scholars (Jacka 2004), 
NGOs, urban and middle class media practitioners, the government (e.g. the Women’s 
Federation-supported newspaper Nongjianu Baishitong mentioned above) and the 
market sector. These alliances often, although not always, lead to some kind of 
cultural initiatives, such as maintaining websites and publishing newsletters, as well 
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as the formation of arts and performance troupes, such as the Dagong Youth Arts 
Group in Beijing. In south China, life in the factory assembly line and dormitory 
regimes has given rise to a distinct ‘dagong culture’ consisting of songs, dagong 
poetry, a myriad of self-funded dagong media publications and online literature 
centring on dagong experiences. However, due to the perceived lack of commercial 
viability by publishers, its impact and reach is limited. 
The Chinese media tend to deal with urban themes (although rural migrants may 
feature in such representations) and speak to urban interests and concerns (Zhao 2002, 
2008). At the same time, Chinese media consumers are divided into those with urban 
household registration and those with rural household registration, the latter group 
including rural migrants in the city. It is often easy to forget that although migrants 
come to the city primarily as a form of cheap labour, they also figure significantly as 
consumers in the urban marketplace, including as consumers of urban-oriented media. 
While in many cases consuming urban-centric media and popular culture can be an 
essential aspect of their encounter with modernity, the reality is that they have little 
option but to negotiate with the content of these products, which, on the whole, do not 
defend their interests or advocate their points of view. 
The support of the state, NGOs and various other organisations for rural migrants 
often produces complex and ambiguous results. As Jacka’s (2006) fieldwork in 
Beijing shows, migrants are reluctant to accept all aspects of the migrant subject 
positions assembled by the Migrant Women’s Club (under the auspices of the All 
China Women’s Federation and funded by the Ford Foundation) and the collective 
that publishes Nongjianu Baishitong. Over recent years a state-initiated policy has 
been promoting media coverage of rural themes and issues in news and current affairs, 
as part of the latest ideology of ‘building a new socialist countryside’. As part of the 
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official discursive exercise of building social harmony, state media have consciously 
promoted positive stories featuring model migrant workers and endorsing their 
contribution to China’s modernisation process. 
 
Recent research shows that migrants are not passive recipients of a set of cultural 
practices determined by their socio-economic role or the cultural narratives with 
which they engage, nor are they inventing their own practices de novo (Sun 2012c; 
Sun 2012d, Sun 2014). Workers’ media practice also takes the form of adopting new 
media and communication technologies to produce alternative materials as 
testimonials to workers’ work conditions, labour disputes and the everyday reality of 
marginalisation (Xing 2012). For instance, migrant workers have become increasingly 
savvy with the use of new media technologies to protect their rights and publicise 
individual experiences of injustice, including work-place injuries, failure to receive 
wages and unacceptable working and living standards (Tong 2012). Qiu (2009) refers 
to these incidents as ‘new media events’. Contrasting them with televised events, 
rituals and ceremonies, which are sleek in presentation, grand in scale and often take 
place in important spaces, Qiu argues that these media practices, enabled by the 
Internet and new media technologies, nevertheless have the capacity to raise public 
awareness and effect real social change, even though they are small in scale. However, 
research also cautions against a narrow political empowerment narrative. After all, 
most rural migrant workers use mobile phones to cope with boredom and alienation. 
Although they use camera phones for “representing the world, constructing the self, 
transcending limited circumstances, envisaging new possibilities, and planning for the 
future” (Wallis 2013, 121), not all these practices lead to collective actions or the 




Worker activists also engage in various forms of creative practice, such as dagong 
poetry and fiction. Whereas one could be forgiven for thinking that dagong life in the 
industrial heartland, notorious for its low pay, high levels of alienation and punishing 
effects on the body and soul, is hardly the ideal stuff for poetry, the truth is that long 
work hours and lack of tertiary education have not stopped many literary-minded 
workers from creating poetry for self-expression. For many worker-poets, writing 
poems is no longer an idle pursuit; it is about finding meaning and purpose in an 
otherwise meaningless existence. Many lines from dagong poetry, for instance, have 
been transformed into lyrics by activist songwriters and performers, enabling them to 
be ‘read’ and performed in a variety of formats. Sun Heng, a well-known worker-
singer and songwriter from the New Worker Art and Cultural Festival in Picun, rural 
Beijing, regularly puts music to dagong poems, and performs them to migrant worker 
audiences. Also, lines from dagong poetry are often chosen to accompany the visual 
presentations, installations and exhibitions showcasing the work and living conditions 
of workers, leading to a range of highly dispersed and unpredictable modes of 
distribution, available to both workers and urban consumers. Finally, most worker-
poets utilise online spaces, particularly blogs, to publish their work and engage in 
dialogue with readers (Sun 2012a). This approach allows these writers to bypass the 
conventional institution of publishing. At the same time, the online reputation of some 
of these writers has led to book contracts with more traditional publishers.  
 
Migrant workers write blogs on dagong lives, and activists and leaders from the 
worker community effectively use Weibo (a micro-blogging platform similar to 
Twitter) to inform, mobilise, organise and coordinate collective actions against 
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capitalist management (Qiu 2012). Other activists produce visual materials, including 
videos, documentaries and photography, for the primary purpose of raising awareness 
among the wider community, as well as class consciousness among the workers. 
Although these grassroots media practices can hardly compete with mainstream media 
in terms of the scale of production and level of exposure, they nevertheless represent 
some nascent media forms and practices that have been made possible by the advent 
of digital visual technologies and online spaces (Sun 2012c). It has been observed that 
with the exceptionally high level of uptake of mobile phones and social media 
platforms such as QQ (a Chinese version of Skype) by rural migrant workers, 
engagement in new media practices has become an integral aspect of the very fabric 
of the everyday experience of the worker, especially workers that belong to the 
younger generation (Qiu 2009). In other words, workers’ media practices should no 
longer be considered as external to workers’ socio-economic experience as industrial 




The world has grown increasingly fond of talking about ‘China’s rise’ and a 
‘prosperous China’, as well as the country’s fast growing middle class and emerging 
super-rich. But beneath this prosperous image lies a different China consisting of 
myriad marginalised social groups. The individuals comprising these groups, each 
with a modest dream of greater equality and less discrimination in their often bleak 
and harsh lives, cast a disquieting shadow over the vision of a rejuvenated China with 
common prosperity that is the stuff of President Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’. 
Paramount among these groups are the nation’s workers and peasants who, in the 
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socialist era, were hailed as one of most progressive forces in history, and represented 
the most advanced agents of production. Now numbering more than 260 million and 
still growing, rural migrant workers constitute the core of China’s post-socialist 
industrial working class and underclass, and are an embodiment of the country’s most 
intractable problems of inequality, even though their labour has played a crucial role 
in enabling and sustaining the country’s remarkable economic growth. 
 
Despite this, it is equally important to realise that most rural migrants are 
motivated by a sense of hope, however tenuous it may be. This hope takes myriad 
forms, including hope for a better future for themselves and, more commonly, for 
their children. This hope may also be gender- and generation-specific. Research 
suggests, for instance, that a key motivation for migration for young women is to 
avoid early marriages and childbirth and secure a better future (Benyon 2004). We 
also know that rural young women in Beijing report enjoying relative autonomy from 
parental and hierarchical control and having freedom to choose an ideal mate 
(Gaetano 2004, 2015). In fact, rural-to-urban migration to the city has indeed begun to 
challenge gender relations in the village. Increasingly, rural migrant men not only 
need to compete with more wealthy urbanites and better off rural counterparts outside 
the family, they also have to make ‘masculine compromises’ at home, since migrant 
women may make more money than they do (Choi and Peng 2016). But hope operates 
as a double-edged sword. Many hope that one day they will be able to find a way to 
settle in the city, and that their hard work will give their children a better chance for 
the future. Rural migrants’ hope is an important moral resource for both the state and 
the market. It dovetails with the needs of the Party for a motivated labour force. It is 
also an essential aspect of the neoliberal project to instill in rural migrants a strong, 
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internalised optimism for improvement, so that they remain committed to playing 
their essential (albeit menial) role in creating and sustaining China’s economic 
success. In this sense, individuals’ hope may stand in the way of organizing large-
scale collective action aiming for a radical improvement of their political, social and 
economic circumstances. It may well be for this reason that so far, there is little 
evidence pointing to the capacity of workers to organize labor-rights-related actions 
on a large scale. In fact, research has also shown that the state continues to place 
severe restrictions on And it is not at all clear whether workers will be able to build 
their own autonomous unions and win the right to freedom of association – both 
essential to the effectiveness of the labor movement – any time in the near future 
(Chan, Pun, and Selden 2013). At the same time, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that rural migrants’ determination to stay on in the city, which is also motivated by 
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